NOTE

SAFETY VALVE CLOSED: THE REMOVAL OF NONVIOLENT OUTLETS FOR DISSENT AND THE ONSET OF ANTI-ABORTION VIOLENCE
"It is bad enough," opined the New York Times two days after the murder of abortion doctor Barnett Slepian, "that conservatives in Congress and in state legislatures are working to dismantle reproductive rights by banning certain procedures, such as so-called partial birth abortion, and by requiring waiting periods and parental consent before an abortion can be obtained.
But those restrictions are at least imposed by the normal give and take of political and judicial struggle in democracy. What is outrageous is the attempt to shut down abortion by illegal means -by shooting the doctors or bombing the clinics or harassing the women seeking to exercise their constitutional right."'
The New York Times does not usually devote its lead editorial to murders in upstate New York. But Dr. Slepian's killing, of course, was no ordinary street crime. In addition to the personal horrors of murder -Slepian was shot in his home, leaving his wife without a husband and his four children without a father 2 -the slaying evoked a sense of political horror as well. As major newspapers across the country proclaimed, Slepian's murder was especially outrageous because it was committed by an opponent of abortion trying to achieve his goals through violence, rather than through the normal give and take of democratic politics. 3 This normal give and take of democratic society provides dissenters with a range of peaceful methods to achieve their goals. Dissenters can vote for candidates who share their views, petition their legislatures to change laws, and distribute literature alerting other citizens of their concerns. In addition, they can conduct peaceful protests and engage in other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience. These outlets sued. 10 Even within this post-Roe violence, an examination of the rise and fall of mass nonviolent civil disobedience in the late i98Os and the dramatic increase in anti-abortion violence beginning in the early 199os indicates that anti-abortion violence is closely related to the repression of nonviolent outlets for dissent.
Part II of this Note demonstrates that the relationship between the elimination of nonviolent channels for dissent and the onset of violence has enjoyed broad and deep support in legal and social discourse. Judges, journalists, legal scholars, social scientists, and nonviolent activists have all articulated the principle that preserving nonviolent avenues of dissent helps avoid violence. This principle has been virtually ignored in our national abortion discussion" and, if recognized, would have important implications for future lawmaking.
The goal of this Note is to contribute to a better understanding of the causes of anti-abortion violence. Recognition that the removal of certain nonviolent options may result in anti-abortion violence does not excuse the bombings and murders; rather, exploring a likely cause contributes to the process of ending the violence, a goal shared by citizens on both sides of the abortion debate.' 2 The Boston Globe was correct to note that such violence is "a cancer" and a threat to our system of government; 13 for precisely this reason, we should seek a deeper understanding of the causes of anti-abortion violence, so that it may be eliminated. Ultimately, this Note suggests that the causes of antiabortion violence run deeper than such vogue explanations as "the incendiary statements of pro-lifers comparing abortion to murder," or "the religious fanaticism of most anti-abortion activists." [Roe] forced Americans to add a new phrase to their political lexicon: anti-abortion violence."). Recognizing the role of Roe in the onset of anti-abortion violence does not necessarily present an argument for its reversal; indeed this Note presents no such argument. See infra p. 1226. However, policymakers cannot seriously attempt to end or limit anti-abortion violence without delving into its causes. Understanding the role of Roe is vital to discerning which measures might reduce the violence and which ones unwittingly exacerbate it.
11 A few commentators have articulated this concern. See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Some Say Law Too Harsh on Abortion Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 8. 12 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Preparing for More Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at Ax (quoting a statement of the United States Catholic Conference that "killing in the name of pro-life makes a mockery of the pro-life cause.... In the name and in the true spirit of pro-life, we call on all in the pro-life movement to condemn such violence in no uncertain terms").
13 Fatal Terror, supra note 3, at A16. 14 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29 (noting "the essential truth about most anti-abortion activists" that "[tihey are religious fanatics"); Violence Against Abortion Doctors, supra note i, at A20 (warning that "accusations by some antiabortionists that abortion providers are committing murder[] can only fuel more terrorism").
view; after more than two decades, they have done nothing to halt the violence.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION OPPOSITION TACTICS BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE
Concerted efforts to limit or ban abortion did not begin in the United States until 182 1. Prior to that time, abortion, at least early in pregnancy, was unrestricted; according to one scholar, it was "neither prohibited nor uncommon. " "
A. Opposition Prior to Roe
In 1821 Connecticut passed the nation's first anti-abortion statute, which banned the use of poisons to conduct abortions, perhaps to protect women's health.
16 By 1828 Missouri, Illinois, and New York had all passed similar laws.
7 Thus, when citizens were first motivated to oppose abortion, they did so through legislative action, beginning a pattern that would last for at least 150 years.
Legislative action continued throughout the i8oos. By 186o twenty states had enacted abortion laws; another forty statutes were passed between 186o and 188o. 26 The Maine Conference of the Congregational Church described the practice as "the darkest picture that reason or taste could allow" and suggested that it was worse than "the horrors of intemperance, of slavery and of war." 27 These descriptions of abortion -as murder, as the moral equivalent of killing children after birth, as a horror worse than slavery or war -brought the same response that concern for the mother's health had prompted earlier in the century: petitioning of legislatures. Abortion opponents "organized an effective media and lobbying campaign, ' The consistent pattern of abortion opposition through legislative action continued and grew through the end of the nineteenth century, bringing a significant increase in the number of abortion-related statutes. 32 Ultimately, "Victorian-era morals" virtually eliminated legal acceptance of abortion at the close of the nineteenth century, with lawmakers "craft[ing] ever-tighter abortion restrictions." 33 While abortion was the subject of considerable legislative action, historical records again indicate no anti-abortion violence.
The legislative action of the late i8oos gave way to a first half of the twentieth century "remarkably free from debate about abortion. The anti-abortion response to these developments once again focused almost exclusively on legislative action. 4 ' Some groups also offered support for pregnant women and alternatives to abortion, and others offered counseling about the dangers of abortion. 42 In addition, abortion opponents distributed pamphlets with "grisly" pictures of aborted fetuses 43 (much as they would in later decades), and the Roman Catholic church attacked abortion from the pulpit, holding days of mourning for legislators who supported "murder." 44 Even during this period in which abortion was "a fiercely controversial issue, ' 45 not a single act of violence is reported.
B. The Court Closes a Door and Anti-Abortion Violence Begins
When the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, abortion opponents who had previously sought change through their legislatures could no longer use that outlet to prohibit abortion. 46 46 To be sure, the legislative process remains available for debates about limits on abortion in the third trimester, dilation and extraction abortion (also known as "partial-birth abortion"), parental notification provisions, and waiting periods. For a detailed and up-to-date account of the premised its recognition of a constitutional right to abortion on its inability to determine when life begins. 4 7 To Roe's critics, of course, this seemed exceedingly uncertain ground upon which to remove abortion from the realm of ordinary legislative politics.
48
Professor Tribe describes the result best: "Roe's recognition of a constitutionally protected right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy shut the door to direct political action to restrict abortion .... 49 Abortion opponents felt they had been stripped of their political power to effect democratic change. <http://www.agi-usa.orglpubs/abort_law-status.html> (on file at the Harvard Law School Library). While these sorts of legislative battles certainly allow for political action, these restrictions seem more symbolic than substantive because they do not apply to the vast majority of abortions. Even those critical of efforts to end abortion have recognized that these provisions are mainly a substitute for the legislative determinations abortion opponents desire. See, e.g, Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 ( 7 th Cir. i999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("These statutes, remember, are not concerned with saving fetuses, with protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with protecting the health of women, [or] with protecting viable fetuses .... They are concerned with making a statement in an ongoing war for public opinion...."); Ellen Goodman, Abortion Politics Won't Go Away, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1999, at E7 ("Frankly, I preferred the old days when the right-to-life strategy was at least principled. Prolifers lobbied for a flat-out ban on abortions. They were out front about their goals. But having lost this argument with the public, the strategy has shifted from trying to make abortion illegal to trying to make it impossible.").
47 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."). 
D. A "More Serious Explosion": The Deadly Violence of the 199os
The civil disobedience that disappeared as a primary tactic of antiabortion radicals did not go unreplaced. On the heels of the lower levels of violence of the late i98os, the early 199os saw a change in tactics and a rise in anti-abortion violence. 68 Violence rose slightly from 74 incidents in 1990 to 95 in I 9 9I.
9
In addition to the stifling of nonviolent civil disobedience, abortion opponents faced another setback in 1992 when the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 70 Casey technically concerned Pennsylvania's restrictions on abortion (such as a 24-hour waiting period and mandatory husband notification) 71 and became a vehicle for the reconsideration of Roe. After nineteen years of being unable to achieve their goal through the legislative process, abortion opponents believed the Court might return abortion to the "normal give and take" of democracy. 72 In the days before oral arguments, the New York Times reported that the appeals court in Pennsylvania "effectively pronounc[ed] Roe dead" with abortion opponents "cheering the... trend." 73 These cheers were stifled, however, when a divided Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe, with four Justices dissenting. The dissenters were cognizant of the relationship between the availability of democratic outlets and the avoidance of civil strife:
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlets for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.
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Casey thus added to the disappearance of nonviolent civil disobedience the assurance that abortion would remain outside the realm of ordinary politics. Roe was reinforced: abortion was not only legal, but could not be made illegal without amending the Constitution.
Anti-abortion violence surged to unprecedented levels, a response that was foreseen not only by the Casey dissenters, but also by abortion-rights advocates themselves. 75 There were 196 reported acts of violence against abortion providers in 1992, more than twice the number reported in the year before Casey. In 1993, the number of incidents surged to 437, including the killing of Dr. David Gunn in Florida, the first murder victim of anti-abortion terrorism.
76
As Dr. Gunn's murder illustrates, the nature of the violence, as well as the Thus the history of abortion opposition -and within it, the history of anti-abortion violence -indicates that the current strategy of increased restrictions of nonviolent outlets may be tragically miscalculated as a means of preventing violence. As courts and legislatures have foreclosed nonviolent outlets for dissent, violence has increased. Continuing to impose and multiply such restrictions on nonviolent abortion opposition 8° threatens to place more lives in danger and to exacerbate, rather than eliminate, the violence of the 199os.
II. THE REPRESSION OF NONVIOLENT AVENUES OF DISSENT
AND THE ONSET OF VIOLENCE
The understanding that the removal of nonviolent outlets and the onset of violence are closely related has deep roots in the United States and elsewhere. In this Part, I will explore these roots and discuss some reasons why this relationship has been virtually ignored in our national abortion debate. 80 Governments continue to multiply the penalties for nonviolent abortion dissent. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-o8145, 2000 WL io8886 (Mass., Jan. 24, 2000) (describing a proposed Massachusetts law which would impose jail terms of up to two and a half years for protesting twice within 25 feet of an abortion provider).
A. Broad and Deep Support for Safety Valve Theories
The notion that nonviolent action provides a safety valve is often traced to Justice Brandeis's 1927 concurrence (joined by Justice Holmes) in Whitney v. California.," Brandeis and Holmes suggested that the Founders understood this important function of providing nonviolent outlets for dissent: "[Those who won our independence] knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; ... that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies .... ,, 82 The theory that nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence did not, however, originate with Justice Brandeis. 83 Rather, the idea became prominent in i9x9 and 1920, with the nation in the throes of "anti-Bolshevik hysteria," as liberal journals such as The Nation and The New Republic were warning that repression makes violent outbursts more likely. 8 4 The likelihood that repression of nonviolent outlets would fuel violence was perhaps best stated by a writer in Century, who analogized repression to a dam about to burst -invariably resulting in the "banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction." 85 Suppression frequently "driv[es] the passions of the situation underground, there to gather fresh strength for an even more serious explosion six months or a year later." 8 6
Permeating this "free speech as safety valve" literature is a particular emphasis on the relationship between free speech and the democratic process. That is, free speech provides a safety valve because our system allows dissident speech to have an effect by influ- ur present way of thinking about free speech did not spring from the foreheads of clever jurists. Ordinary people nurtured it, wrote about it, experimented with it, and argued over it endlessly in dealing with real problems they found urgently in need of resolution.").
84 Id. at 6og-io (citing Danger Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, igi9, at x86, 186 (noting that repression "is turning thoughtful working people into dangerous radicals"); and Freedom of Speech: Whose Concern?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, i919, at 102, 103 (suggesting that repression is only "for those whose desire is revolution")).
85 Bobertz, supra note 83, at 611 (quoting Glenn Frank, Is Free Speech Dangerous?, CENTURY, July, 1920, at 355, 359) . 86 Id. This view of free expression is still widely accepted today. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMER-SON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (1963) ("[S]uppression drives opposition underground, leaving those suppressed either apathetic or desperate. It thus saps the vitality of the society and makes resort to force more likely."); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1027 (3th ed. 1997) ("[F]ree speech promotes political stability by providing a safety valve for dissent.").
[Wol. 113:1210 encing the democratic processA 7 Thomas Emerson, for example, notes that free expression "is particularly significant for political decisions. '88 Professor Zechariah Chafee, whose first edition of Freedom of Speech became influential as the safety valve theory was gaining recognition in the 1920s,89 described "the great strength of our argument against violent-talking radicals" as follows:
[W]e could say to them: "It is true that in the countries that you came from you naturally resorted to violence because you had no vote and could not abolish the abuses to which you objected. It is not so in this country. If you want a change, go and vote for it, vote for men who have promised to bring it to pass." 90 Chafee argued that, by depriving dissidents of the opportunity to enact change through the legislature, this powerful argument evaporates, rendering violence more likely to occur.
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The notion that preserving nonviolent channels for dissent reduces violence has also received support from several social science studies of domestic conflict. Like legal theorists, many conflict scholars agree that free expression and political participation serve as outlets for passionate opposition. Within this literature, scholars view activists as having a "repertoire of action"; their choice of what type of action to employ depends, at least in part, on government actions:
It is also widely recognized that the occurrence of violence depends on the actions of both parties to the conflict. Groups in conflict with rivals, or with authorities, have choices about how to press their claims. Their opponents similarly have choices about how to respond. The shape and extent of violence depend on the kinds of choices made by both groups. This implies a third point, that authorities have substantial responsibility for violence .... 92 This emphasis on the impact of alternative outlets on the incidence of violence is also described in Harry Eckstein's review of conflict literature, in which Eckstein observes that, under at least one theory of collective violence, "a clear relationship would show up between the incidence of collective political violence and the availability of alterna- 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (197o); see also
EMERSON, supra note 86, at 9 (noting that the power of free expression to influence political action is important because "[i]t is through the political process that most of the immediate decisions on the survival, welfare and progress of a society are made.").
89 See Bobertz, supra note 83, at 609 ("If any one source of ideas had the greatest impact, however, it was Zechariah Chafee's book, Freedom of Speech."). tive channels of making and realizing 'claims."' ' 93 Eckstein notes that this theory is supported by the fact that civil conflict is much less deadly in democratic nations than in other regimes, which "must be due to a toleration in democracies of protests that, in repressive regimes, never surface, or else are forced to take virulent forms."
Similarly, Mark Irving Lichbach has noted that, while there is support for the idea that repression deters dissident activity, "[r]epression frustrates demands and fosters a sense of injustice," perhaps causing "[a] hard core of the opposition group [to] become highly dedicated, organized, and deadly." 9 5 Analyzing choices among violent and nonviolent avenues of dissent, Lichbach found that "an increase in government's repression of nonviolent activities may reduce the level of nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase the level of its violent activities" because "the relative costs of nonviolent activities to the opposition group have been raised." 96 The recognition of a causal connection between repression of nonviolent action and the onset of violence is not confined to the academic arena. Rather, the most successful and revered nonviolent political activist in United States history, Martin Luther King, Jr., subscribed to the very same principle. In Why We Can't Wait, 97 King writes that, in 1963, "[f]or the first time in the long and turbulent history of the nation, almost one thousand cities were engulfed in civil turmoil, with violence trembling just below the surface."
98 King believed that "the knife of violence was ... close to the nation's aorta" and that only the presence of nonviolent outlets for dissent prevented "the dark threat of violence [from] erupt[ing] in blood." 9 9 He explained:
The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations, and he must release them. So let him march; let him make prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; let him go on freedom rides -and try to understand why he must do so. Wade." 10 1 One columnist for the Times went even further and blamed the violence on "the essential truth about most anti-abortion activists," that "[t]hey are religious fanatics."' 10 2 Similar explanations dominated the mainstream press six years later when Dr. Barnett Slepian was murdered, as both the CBS Evening News and the New York Times suggested that the violence was attributable to the strong rhetoric of the anti-abortion movement. 1 0 3 'Considering that the morally charged debate over abortion has continued for at least a century and a half, 1 0 4 these "explanations" appear more bluster than substantive analysis; they tell us little about why a subject that has always been fiercely but nonviolently contested suddenly turned violent. 105 One reason that policymakers have not seriously and openly considered the role of government restrictions in anti-abortion violence may be a fear that doing so would assign blame in a politically unpopular way. When Professor 'ribe was presented with the safety valve argument as set forth by civil libertarians such as Harvey Silverglate, Nat Hentoff, and Professor David Cole, he deemed the argument to be "blaming the victim in the most perverse way."' 0 1 6 This focus on the blame value of anti-abortion violence suggests a halfhearted consideration of its causes, with politically unpopular ones eliminated without serious consideration. To the extent that lawmakers share this approach, our failure to arrive at a solution is unsurprising.
Furthermore, policymakers may fear undermining their own positions on Roe. Those who favor the decision are naturally loath to consider that the decision may have had negative consequences. Moreover, abortion-rights advocates benefit from the opportunity to characterize the opposition as fanatical and gain both popular and political strength from the rallying point provided by violence that can be characterized as the result of anti-abortion views. 1 0 7
A fear of undermining Roe by recognizing the relationship between nonviolent and violent dissent might be misplaced. While this Note presents evidence that Roe spurred anti-abortion violence by removing the primary nonviolent outlet for opposition, constitutional decisions cannot be evaluated solely on whether a violent reaction is likely to occur. Consider, for example, Brown v. Board of Education, which contributed to violence by mandating the desegregation of public schools, and yet is widely considered a wise and just decision. Furthermore, the majority in Roe removed abortion from the "normal give and take" of legislative politics because of a view that the Constitution required them to do so; regardless of one's opinion of Roe, the fact that some members of society will violently disapprove is not, in itself, a sound basis on which to interpret the Constitution.
However, when considering the ongoing tide of access laws and buffer zones, the correlation between the removal of nonviolent outlets and the onset of violence is critical. Access laws restrict nonviolent protest and civil disobedience with the explicit goal of preventing violence and increasing access to abortion.
8
The patterns of antiabortion violence, however, suggest that further limiting nonviolent protests -either by increasing penalties for interfering with access or by establishing buffer zones within which activists cannot demonstrate or distribute literature -is counterproductive; such limits appear to have contributed to the increase of violence. Moreover, evidence suggests that access was actually better before access laws, and that the drastic rise in anti-abortion violence in the I9gos has reduced access more than the nonviolent protest behavior that gave rise to access laws. In the early 199os, fewer doctors were learning to perform abortions, and observers noted that "this trend may become more pronounced if violence continues."' 0 9 Between 1992 and 1996, when the violence reached unprecedented levels, more than fourteen percent of abortion providers stopped providing services." 0 The NAF has noted that "a shortage of trained providers and continued threats of violence are important barriers to access.""' Furthermore, by 1996 there were roughly fifteen percent fewer abortions performed than in i990,112 and the number dropped even further in 1997, to its lowest level since i975." ' Observers across the country have suggested that the recent wave of anti-abortion violence has played a role in reducing access." 4 CONCLUSION However policymakers react to the relationship between nonviolent outlets and violent dissent, one thing is clear: further restrictions on nonviolent dissent should be avoided. Governments at all levels possess the power to direct existing abortion opposition toward outlets that are more acceptable than bullets and bombs. Our legal institutions are capable of channeling violent dissent into more civil behavior; for them to do so, our leaders must resist the temptation toward squelching all dissent, even that which is nonviolent. As politically popular and seemingly innocuous as access laws and buffer zones may be, by preventing nonviolent dissent, they contribute to a climate in which violent dissent is more likely. Such policies ignore what Martin Luther King, Jr., called "a fact of history," and risk "driving the passions of the situation underground, there to gather fresh strength for an even more serious explosion."' '1 As the casualty numbers continue to rise, and as citizens on all sides of the abortion issue seek an end to the violence, a more responsible public policy is needed.
